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Abstract. An inequality measure is `consistent' if it ranks distribu-
tions the same irrespective of whether health quantities are represented
in terms of attainment or shortfalls. This consistency property severely
restricts the set of admissible inequality measures. We show that, within
a more general setting of separate measures for attainments and short-
falls, the consistency property is a combination of two conditions. The
rst is a compelling rationality condition that says that the attainment
measure should rank attainment distributions as the shortfall measure
ranks shortfall distributions. The second is an overly demanding con-
dition that says that the attainment measure and the shortfall measure
should be identical. By dropping the latter condition, the restrictions on
the admissible inequality measures disappear.
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1 Introduction
Clarke et al. (2002) have shown that conclusions drawn by standard in-
equality measures may dier depending on whether the individual health
data are represented by attainments or by shortfalls to an upper bound.
Observations like this have led Erreygers (2009), Lambert and Zheng
(2011) and Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012) to search for `con-
sistent' inequality measures, which rank attainment distributions identi-
cally as the corresponding shortfall distributions. It has been established
that this property|to which we refer as `strong consistency'|severely
restricts the set of admissible inequality measures.
The following example illustrates the limitations imposed by strong
consistency. Consider the two-individual attainment distributions x =
(10; 70) and y = (30; 90). With an upper bound of 100, the correspond-
ing shortfall distributions are x0 = (90; 30) and y0 = (70; 10), respectively.
Relative inequality measures, such as the well-known Gini and Theil mea-
sures, decrease under equal absolute additions for all individuals. Hence,
each relative inequality measure judges x as more unequal than y, but
x0 as less unequal than y0, and thus fails strong consistency. Moreover,
the negative implications of strong consistency go much beyond ruling
out the relative inequality measures. For example, Lambert and Zheng
(2011) show that the variance is the only subgroup decomposable in-
equality measure that satises strong consistency.
We will argue that strong consistency is unduly demanding. The
matter is important, as an appropriate weakening of the property turns
out to impose no a priori restrictions on the set of admissible inequality
measures.
First we focus on the implications of strong consistency. The prop-
erty aims to capture the rationality idea that inequality judgments should
not depend on the arbitrary choice of how to represent the basic data.
Therefore, strong consistency should not only apply to attainments and
shortfalls, but also to other representations. We show that consistency
with respect to one additional representation|in terms of `relative' short-
falls, which measure the proportional (instead of the absolute) increase
required to reach the upper bound|already excludes all relative, abso-
lute and intermediate inequality measures. That is, a direct extension
of the logic underlying strong consistency implies the impossibility of in-
equality measurement using standard methods. This nding encourages
scrutinizing the property.
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In order to examine strong consistency, we consider a more general set-
ting that allows separate inequality measures for attainments and short-
falls. Strong consistency may be seen as a combination of two properties,
viz., `weak consistency' and `uniqueness'. Weak consistency says that the
attainment measure should rank attainment distributions in the same
way as the shortfall measure ranks the corresponding shortfall distribu-
tions. Uniqueness says that the attainment measure and the shortfall
measure should be identical. Weak consistency is sucient to capture
the desired rationality requirement, which means that uniqueness is su-
peruous and strong consistency is too demanding. We show that if weak
consistency is imposed without uniqueness, then any relative, absolute or
intermediate inequality measure can be chosen for either the attainment
or the shortfall measure. This choice then fully determines the properties
of the other measure.
The next section introduces notation and basic concepts. Section 3
considers the implications of strong consistency and of its underlying
logic. Section 4 examines strong consistency in the general setting with
separate attainment and shortfall measures. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
A distribution is a vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) in Rn++. The positive
real number xi represents the health quantity|e.g., an attainment or a
shortfall|of individual i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. For a distribution x, we denote
the mean (x1 + x2 +    + xn)=n by x. We say that a distribution x is
non-equal if not all of the entries of x are equal. We write 1n for the
n-vector with a one at each entry.
An inequality measure is a symmetric and strictly Schur-convex func-
tion I : Rn++ ! R that associates with each distribution x in Rn++ an
inequality level I(x). Symmetry and strict Schur-convexity ensure that
the inequality measure is anonymous (switching individuals' quantities
does not change inequality) and satises the Pigou-Dalton principle (re-
gressive transfers between individuals increase inequality). These prop-
erties are standard in the literature (see, e.g., Cowell, 2000, and Lambert,
2001).
It is common to distinguish inequality measures with respect to their
behaviour under equal proportionate and equal absolute increases. We
distinguish relative, absolute and intermediate inequality measures.
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(i) An inequality measure I is relative if I(x) = I(x) for each distri-
bution x and each  > 1.
(ii) An inequality measure I is absolute if I(x) = I(x + 1n) for each
distribution x and each  > 0.
(iii) An inequality measure I is intermediate if I(x + 1n) < I(x) <
I(x) for each non-equal distribution x, each  > 0 and each  > 1.
Note that if I is a relative inequality measure, then I(x) > I(x + 1n)
for each non-equal distribution x and each  > 0, and if I is an absolute
inequality measure, then I(x) < I(x) for each non-equal distribution x
and each  > 1 (see, e.g., Moyes, 1999, Proposition 3.4).
Finally, let b be an upper bound on attainments and let B collect
each distribution x in Rn++ such that xi < b for each individual i =
1; 2; : : : ; n. For a distribution x in B, we denote the distribution (b  
x1; b x2; : : : ; b xn) by b x. If x is an attainment distribution, then b x
is the corresponding shortfall distribution. Conversely, if x is a shortfall
distribution, then b   x is the corresponding attainment distribution.
Note that the set B may be interpreted as the set of all attainment
distributions or, alternatively, as the set of all shortfall distributions.
3 Strong consistency and its implications
Erreygers (2009) requires an inequality measure to take the same value
for an attainment distribution and its corresponding shortfall distribu-
tion. Lambert and Zheng (2011) propose a less demanding consistency
property. They require that an inequality measure's ranking of two at-
tainment distributions coincides with its ranking of the two corresponding
shortfall distributions. We focus on the property of Lambert and Zheng
and refer to it as strong consistency.1
Strong consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
I(x)  I(y) if and only if I(b  x)  I(b  y).
Strong consistency severely restricts the set of admissible inequality
measures. Lambert and Zheng (2011, Theorem 3) show that strong con-
sistency is violated by all relative measures and by the particular inter-
mediate measures satisfying Zoli's (1999) `exible inequality equivalence'
1Erreygers' (2009) `perfect complementarity' property requires I(x) = I(b  x) for
each distribution x in B. Clearly, perfect complementarity implies strong consistency.
Hence, a critique of strong consistency applies also to perfect complementarity.
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property.2 The following proposition generalizes the result of Lambert
and Zheng to all relative and all intermediate inequality measures.3 The
proof relies on a simple extension of the two-individual example presented
in the introduction.
Proposition 1. There is no relative or intermediate inequality measure
that satises strong consistency.
Proof. Let b be the upper bound on attainments. Let c, d and e be
positive real numbers such that c + d + e < b. Consider two attainment
distributions x = (c; c; : : : ; c; c+d) and y = (c+e; c+e; : : : ; c+e; c+d+e).
For each relative and each intermediate inequality measure I, we have
I(x) > I(y). Now consider the shortfall distributions b  x = (b  c; b 
c; : : : ; b c; b c d) and b y = (b c e; b c e; : : : ; b c e; b c d e).
For each relative and each intermediate inequality measure I, we have
I(b x) < I(b y). Hence, each relative and each intermediate inequality
measure violates strong consistency.
The fact that strong consistency rules out many interesting inequal-
ity measures motivates putting the property under scrutiny. In the next
section we will argue that strong consistency is too demanding and that
a proper weakening allows far more freedom in choosing inequality mea-
sures. But rst we look at the implication of extending the logic of strong
consistency to a third representation of the basic data.
Consider a representation of a distribution in terms of `relative' short-
falls. Whereas the shortfall distribution looks at the absolute amount
that has to be added to an attainment to reach the upper bound, the
relative shortfall distribution looks at the factor by which the attainment
has to be multiplied in order to reach the upper bound. For a distribu-
tion x in B, we denote the distribution (b=x1; b=x2; : : : ; b=xn) by b=x. If
2An example of a class of intermediate measures that does not t into Zoli's (1999)
mold is that dened by Seidl and Pngsten (1997).
3There do exist non-absolute inequality measures that satisfy strong consistency.
Lasso de la Vega and Aristondo (2012) start from a given inequality measure and
take the geometric mean of the inequality level of the attainment distribution and
the inequality level of the corresponding shortfall distribution. This geometric mean
is a new inequality measure that satises strong consistency and even Erreygers'
(2009) perfect complementarity property. The advantage of this proposal is that any
relative, absolute or intermediate inequality measure can be used as a starting point
to construct the new inequality measure. The disadvantage is that the new inequality
measure itself is not relative, absolute or intermediate, which means it is outside of
the standard framework.
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x is an attainment distribution, then b=x is the corresponding relative
shortfall distribution (and vice versa).
The following property applies the logic of strong consistency to rel-
ative shortfalls. It requires the inequality rankings of attainment distri-
butions and the corresponding relative shortfall distributions to be the
same.
Strong consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
I(x)  I(y) if and only if I(b=x)  I(b=y).
The next proposition is a counterpart to Proposition 1. The proposi-
tion says that strong consistency excludes all absolute and intermediate
inequality measures.
Proposition 2. There is no absolute or intermediate inequality measure
that satises strong consistency.
Proof. Let b be the upper bound on attainments. Let c > 0, d >
1 and e > 1 be real numbers such that cde < b. Consider two at-
tainment distributions x = (c; c; : : : ; c; cd) and y = (ce; ce; : : : ; ce; cde).
For each absolute and each intermediate inequality measure I, we have
I(x) < I(y). Now consider the relative shortfall distributions b=x =
(b=c; b=c; : : : ; b=c; b=(cd)) and b=y = (b=(ce); b=(ce); : : : ; b=(ce); c=(cde)).
For each absolute and each intermediate inequality measure I, we have
I(b=x) > I(b=y). Hence, each absolute and each intermediate inequality
measure violates strong consistency*.
The rationality idea underlying strong consistency requires that the
inequality ranking should be the same irrespective of whether the basic
data is represented in terms of attainments, (absolute) shortfalls, relative
shortfalls, or in any other way. That is, if strong consistency is accepted as
a compelling rationality requirement, then so should strong consistency.4
But as the following immediate implication of Propositions 1 and 2 shows,
this leads to the impossibility of inequality measurement using standard
methods.5
4We stress that for our purposes here it is irrelevant whether or not relative short-
falls are used in practice. All that matters is that relative shortfalls constitute another
way of representing the same basic data.
5Some authors have considered `super-relative' and `super-absolute' inequality
measures in addition to relative, absolute and intermediate measures (e.g., Amiel and
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Corollary. There is no relative, absolute or intermediate inequality mea-
sure that satises both strong consistency and strong consistency.
We have looked at the severe implications for inequality measurement
of strong consistency and of its underlying logic. Now we turn to a direct
examination of the property.
4 Disentangling strong consistency
We now consider a more general setting that allows for separate inequality
measures for attainments and shortfalls. Thus, we recognize that a priori
one may want dierent properties for an inequality measure depending
on what the numbers to which it applies actually mean (e.g., one may
want the Pigou-Dalton principle if the numbers are incomes, but not if
the numbers are logged incomes).6 We denote the attainment inequality
measure by Ia and the shortfall inequality measure by Is. Note that the
previous setting with a single measure I for attainments and shortfalls
is obtained as a special case by imposing the condition Ia = Is (= I).
We discuss this condition (the `uniqueness' property) at the end of this
section.
A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) consistently compares attain-
ment and shortfall inequality if it satises the following property.
Weak consistency. For all distributions x and y in B, we have
Ia(x)  Ia(y) if and only if Is(b  x)  Is(b  y).
Weak consistency is sucient to guarantee that inequality judgments
do not depend on whether the data are represented in terms of attain-
ments or shortfalls. Moreover, it does the job without the two negative
implications of strong consistency that were identied in the previous
section. To see this, consider the following proposition (of which we omit
the simple proof).
Cowell, 1999, Kolm, 1999, and Zheng, 2007). An inequality measure I is super-relative
if I(x) > I(x) for each non-equal distribution x and each  > 1, and super-absolute
if I(x) < I(x + 1n) for each non-equal distribution x and each  > 0. The proofs
of Propositions 1 and 2 can easily be extended to show that each super-relative and
each super-absolute inequality measure violates both strong consistency and strong
consistency*.
6Marchant (2008) stresses this point in the context of currency unit consistency
for bankruptcy rules.
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Proposition 3. A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) satises weak
consistency if and only if there exists a strictly increasing function f :
R! R such that
Ia(x) = f(Is(b  x)) for each distribution x in B. (1)
First, Proposition 3 reveals that, in contrast to strong consistency
(recall Proposition 1 in Section 3), weak consistency does not a priori
exclude particular inequality measures. Any relative, absolute or inter-
mediate inequality measure may serve as either the attainment measure
or as the shortfall measure. As an example, consider the two inequality
measures
B  ! R : x 7 ! 1
n
nX
i=1
xi
x
ln
xi
x
(2)
and
B  ! R : x 7 ! 1
n
nX
i=1
b  xi
b  x ln
b  xi
b  x . (3)
The inequality measure in equation (2) is the Theil measure, which is
relative and hence excluded by strong consistency. Weak consistency,
by contrast, allows choosing this measure as the attainment measure
Ia, provided that (a strictly increasing transformation of) the measure
in equation (3) is used as the shortfall measure Is.7 Or, conversely, it
allows choosing the measure in equation (2) as the shortfall measure Is,
provided that (a strictly increasing transformation of) the measure in
equation (3) is used as the attainment measure Ia.8 As is clear, the
choice of an attainment measure Ia fully determines the corresponding
shortfall measure Is (up to an increasing transformation), or vice versa.
But this should not come as a surprise. Indeed, the rationality idea we
aim to capture requires exactly that there is nothing left to be said once
the inequality measure for one particular representation of the data is
xed.
7So, in this case, in equation (2) the set B is the set of all attainment distributions,
whereas in equation (3) B is the set of all shortfall distributions.
8Indeed, the existence of a strictly increasing function f such that equation (1)
holds ensures the existence of a strictly increasing function g (viz., g = f 1) such
that Is(x) = g(Ia(b  x)) for each distribution x in B. Incidentally, note that the ar-
gumentation of Allanson and Petrie (2012, 2013) and Kjellsson and Gerdtham (2013)
may be used to provide a justication for using a measure such as that in equation
(3) to measure attainment inequality.
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Second, contrary to strong consistency (recall the corollary in Section
3), weak consistency does not become more restrictive if extended to other
representations of the data. Consider a general ` -representation' that
transforms each attainment using a strictly monotonic function  : B !
R++. For an attainment distribution x in B, we denote the corresponding
` -distribution' ( (x1);  (x2); : : : ;  (xn)) by  (x). For example, we have
 (x) = b   x in the case of shortfalls and  (x) = b=x in the case of
relative shortfalls. Consider an attainment measure Ia and a measure I 
dened by
Ia(x) = f(I ( (x))) for each distribution x in B,
with f a strictly increasing function. We have that Ia ranks attain-
ment distributions in the same way as I ranks the corresponding  -
distributions. Clearly, weak consistency can be extended without impos-
ing additional restrictions on inequality measures: the inequality measure
for, say, attainments may be chosen freely, and this choice fully deter-
mines the inequality measure for each  -representation.
We conclude this section by clarifying the relationship between weak
consistency and strong consistency. The following property on a pair of
inequality measures (Ia; Is) says that there should be a unique inequality
measure to deal with both attainment and shortfall distributions.
Uniqueness. The inequality measures Ia and Is are identical.
As shown by the next proposition (of which we omit the easy proof),
strong consistency coincides with the combination of weak consistency
and uniqueness.
Proposition 4. A pair of inequality measures (Ia; Is) satises weak con-
sistency and uniqueness if and only if there exists an inequality measure
I = Ia = Is that satises strong consistency.
Weak consistency already ensures that inequality judgments do not
depend on the chosen representation of the data. Therefore, uniqueness
is superuous and strong consistency is too demanding.
Given that uniqueness is not required for consistent inequality judg-
ments, the question arises whether there are other justications for the
property. A plausible response would be that uniqueness should be seen
as a property of convenience. It is indeed convenient not having to change
the inequality measure if the representation of the data changes. But this
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mild convenience comes at too high a cost: the propositions and corol-
lary in the previous section amply demonstrate the severely restricting
implications of adding uniqueness to weak consistency.9
For an alternative possible justication, consider the following sce-
nario. Suppose a practitioner possesses the data for an inequality anal-
ysis, but does not possess the information of whether these data are
represented in terms of attainments or in terms of shortfalls. Unique-
ness is compelling in this case, as it is impossible to determine whether
the attainment measure or the shortfall measure should be used. But,
of course, the scenario is highly unlikely: precise information on how
the data are represented is usually available. However, the scenario does
allow another way of seeing why strong consistency is too demanding.
Weak consistency allows use of the information on whether numbers ex-
press attainments or shortfalls in making consistent inequality judgments.
Strong consistency, by additionally imposing uniqueness, does not allow
use of this information. But since the information is readily available in
practice, this additional restriction is uncalled for.
5 Conclusion
We have argued that strong consistency is too demanding. The prop-
erty combines two conditions. The rst is a compelling rationality re-
quirement that states that inequality judgments should not depend on
whether the data is represented in terms of attainments or shortfalls. The
second is an unnecessarily strong condition that demands that the same
inequality measure should be used for attainments and shortfalls. The
latter condition may be seen as convenient, but this convenience comes
at the high cost of ruling out interesting classes of inequality measures.
An exclusive focus on inequality measures satisfying strong consis-
tency would severely impoverish inequality measurement. It is true that
the application of the same, say, relative inequality measure to attain-
ments and to shortfalls yields two dierent inequality rankings. But
these two rankings may each express valid philosophical views on how
to make inequality comparisons.10 A restriction to inequality measures
9As Kolm (1976, p. 420) puts it forcefully in the similar context of consistency with
respect to dierent currency units, \convenience could not be an alibi for endorsing
injustice".
10Allanson and Petrie (2012, 2013) and Kjellsson and Gerdtham (2013) also make
this point.
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that satisfy strong consistency therefore constitutes a partial neglect of
the spectrum of valid views.
A nal word of caution is in order. The temptation should be re-
sisted to blindly apply the well-known inequality measures to any of the
numerous possible representations of the basic data. The properties one
wants for an inequality measure are likely to depend crucially on the spe-
cic way in which the data are represented. Hence, a study of inequality
should ideally motivate both the choice of the particular representations
of the data focused on and the choice of the inequality measures applied
to each of these representations.
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